processing associated with early stages of moral cognition. Our data strongly 22 supports the notion that intentionality is the first input to moral computations. 23
Introduction

32
Moral decision-making is a fundamental aspect of social cognition, and is seen as a 33 product of our biological evolutionary and cultural history. In the past decade, 34 research in multiple academic domains including evolutionary biology, 35 developmental science, economics and cognitive neuroscience has endeavored to 36 more clearly define and investigate this construct. Results from these disciplines 37 suggest that mature moral abilities emerge from a sophisticated integration of 38 2003, Moll et al., 2002 Moll et al., , 2007 . Moral reasoning seems to be underpinned by specific 64 neural circuitry, but, in fact, these circuits are not unique to morality; rather, they 65 involve regions and systems underlying specific affective states, cognitive and 66 motivational processes. 67
68
One serious limitation of a majority of previous studies is that the results rely only 69 on subtraction logic in their designs, which is based on the a priori assumption that 70 one computational process can be added to a pre-existing set of processes without 71 affecting them, assuming that there are no interactions among the different 72 components of a given task. Furthermore, characterizing brain activity in terms of 73 functionally segregated regions does not reveal anything about how different brain 74 regions communicate with each other. Connectivity analyses and high-density 75 event-related potentials (ERPs) can identify patterns of communication between 76 regions that contrast analyses may not detect. Such methods are necessary to 77 advance of knowledge on the neuroscience of morality. This is also important at a 78 theoretical level. The fact that fMRI studies found activation in emotion-related 79 areas such as the amygdala, and vmPFC during morally salient stimuli provides only 80 correlational data, showing that emotions are associated with moral cognition, but 81 is insufficient to determine whether affective processing is taking place during 82 moral evaluations or antecedent to them (Huebner, Dwyer & Hauser, 2008 (2012) 113 in studies on empathy and morality, according to a 2 x 2 factorial design with 114 intention type (intentional vs. accidental) and target type (object vs. person) as 115 within-subjects factors. While participants' electrical brain activity was recorded, 116 participants were required to watch the stimuli, to gaze at the center of the screen, 117 and to judge whether the action was performed intentionally or accidentally. 118
During this part of the experiment, no reaction times were collected to avoid any 119 motor artifacts. After the completion of the EEG recordings, one additional 120 behavioral block was run, during which accuracy and reaction times were recorded. microstate, a standard cluster analysis previously described was employed using 175 the grand-mean ERPs of each condition. This cluster analysis uses a hierarchical 176 agglomerative cluster-algorithm to identify the predominant topographies (i.e., 177 maps) and their sequence within a data set (these methods are implemented in 178 Cartool). The optimal number of maps (i.e., the minimal number of maps that 179 accounts for the greatest variance of the data set) is determined based on a modified 180
Krzanowski-Lai criterion. Importantly, this pattern analysis is reference-free and 181 insensitive to amplitude modulation of the same scalp potential field across 182 conditions, since normalized maps are compared. We also applied the constraint7 that a given scalp topography must be observed for at least five consecutive data 184 points (i.e., 10 ms at a 500-Hz digitization rate) in the group-averaged data. This Table 1 ). 216 --insert Table 1 
Results and Discussion
231
To determine the timing and order of component processes implicated in moral 232 cognition and whether affective processing occurs during moral evaluations or 233 antecedent to them, we used high-density ERPs to examine the spatio-temporal 234 dynamics of the neural processing evoked by the perception of visual morally-laden 235 scenarios. The perception of intentional harm was associated with better (90% vs. 236 71%) and faster reaction times for intentional harm compared to accidental harm (p 237 < 0.05), as well as the specific involvement of the right pSTS, amygdala and vmPFC. 238
These regions were found activated in an fMRI study using the same stimuli and 239 same contrast (Decety et al., 2012). Interestingly, intentional harmful actions were 240 significantly distinguished from the accidental harmful actions in three main time 241 periods (i.e., from 62 to 140 ms, and from 122 to 180 ms post-stimulus, see Figure  242 1). More precisely, a specific scalp potential field with a current source density 243 maximum in the right pSTS (x52, y-60, z21; Talairach coordinates) characterized 244 9 accidental harm during the first time period, whereas a different scalp topography 245 with a current source density in the right amygdala (32, 0, -30, xyz Talairach  246 coordinates from 122-180ms) and vmPFC (3, 38, -7, xyz Talairach coordinates from 247 182-304 ms) characterized the perception of intentional harm (Table 1) and yellow bars, respectively) had different duration depending upon the stimulus 441 type (see Table 1 
